what to do about slightly more evil versions of me
Julian, reacting to Angela's new piece in Salon about phonebanking for the McCain campaign, voices some concern over the candidates' phonebank-from-home systems and their potential value to dirty tricksters.
I'm not as worried. As Julian notes, Angela had a hard time getting people on the phone at all, to say nothing of actually speaking to them. It's hard to imagine an individual doing more damage to democracy this way than they could through more traditional means like printing up some misleading flyers or saying awfully cleverly awful things to people approaching their polling places.
I suppose you could argue that the anonymity of the phone might make the tactic more appealing. But remember: the campaign running the system will have a record of which volunteer called whom. Depending on the system, they may even keep recordings. Judging by the manic zeal with which I saw the chairperson of the Ashburn Obama office encouraged volunteers to find a recording of a fraudulent area robocall, I suspect that any villainous phonebankers would be caught pretty quickly.
I think that hobbyists capable of using technology to amplify their malfeasance remain the larger threat — it's pretty easy to write a script that spreads orders of magnitude more misinformation per hour than a human being can. Which brings me, finally, to the thinly-veiled reason for this post: to link again to my recipe for robocalling. It's just as easy now as it was two years ago — if anything, it's probably cheaper.
One thing I will add, though: Thanks to Tim, I recently had a chance to chat with Chris Soghoian and, over beers outside at Townhouse, we found ourselves describing nearly identical blueprints for voter suppression (Chris's was better in that his involved shady Russian ISPs — more bandwidth and more villainous menace than my podunk coffeeshop scenario/stolen wifi scenario). If the two of us both came up with the same plan, it's a safe bet that some other geeks have, too. It seems likely that at least a few of them will have a go at it.
I'm not sure what to do about this, exactly. Resisting the urge to relax restrictions on institutional calls to mobile phones is probably a good start — not that it'll stop crooks, but it will make the idea of getting a campaign-related call on your mobile a bit more discordant and surprising. It also seems like we could probably spend some government dollars every four years on a DTV-transition-style ad campaign hyping a unified federal election information website. And it might not be a bad idea to provide some Nudge-inspired opt-out election reminders via phone or email on election day. "Check this form on your tax return if you would prefer not to be reminded to vote on election day" — that sort of thing.
Whatever we do, it'll be more a question of education than enforcement: catching malefactors is probably hopeless. People like this will continue to exist, and their powers will continue to grow. But if a voter is given two conflicting sources of information, hopefully they'll at least be confused enough to seek a third.
INCIDENTALLY: Julian's article about online dirty tricks offers a number of interesting possibilities. I'll just add that the Kaminsky DNS bug would have been a totally awesome way of executing BOE-website-spoofing scams. I can't find any up-to-date numbers on the deployment of the patch, but at this point it's got to be complete enough that such an attack would be a very low-percentage play.























