Comments on: making Rumsfeld look like a techie by comparison http://www.manifestdensity.net/2010/04/07/making-rumsfeld-look-like-a-techie-by-comparison/ Just another WordPress weblog Wed, 29 Feb 2012 10:50:20 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3 By: Media indifference – The myth of a free press « Radioactive Gavin is Out of Print http://www.manifestdensity.net/2010/04/07/making-rumsfeld-look-like-a-techie-by-comparison/comment-page-1/#comment-14105 Media indifference – The myth of a free press « Radioactive Gavin is Out of Print Tue, 20 Apr 2010 20:33:03 +0000 http://www.manifestdensity.net/?p=1458#comment-14105 [...] NPR is making Rumsfeld look like a techie by comparison [...] [...] NPR is making Rumsfeld look like a techie by comparison [...] ]]> By: Annoyed http://www.manifestdensity.net/2010/04/07/making-rumsfeld-look-like-a-techie-by-comparison/comment-page-1/#comment-13764 Annoyed Fri, 16 Apr 2010 18:18:07 +0000 http://www.manifestdensity.net/?p=1458#comment-13764 Your characterization of my "sheep and wolves" comment as the fantasy of a 14 year-old script kiddie would say after reading Neuromancer & Nietzsche is hilarious, but it doesn't reduce the point, it is the way it is and the amount of systems getting compromised simply proves that. Personally, I can't stand Nietzsche's work, or the postmodernists & existentialists work thereafter. I think you belittle the point of security networks and systems... look, flat out, it's 2010, we've been TRYING to secure our networks for how long now? How many companies are still getting hacked? Just a year ago I did a SCADA pentest for a company and found multiple external paths to that network, so yeah, they don't get it, it's as simple as that. I don't necessarily agree that cyberwar is a useless way of talking about these problems. It's only FUD if it's definitely FUD, and I don't think the concept of cyberwar is as far fetched as you'd like to make it (although I also hate the word cyber). Going forward, let's consider it as the concept of "total war", ie, meeting the enemy on any front that gains you advantage, as in, why would China attack us with planes when they'd clearly lose? Raising awareness isn't useless if it's focused on achieving a resolution to a problem. Your characterization of my “sheep and wolves” comment as the fantasy of a 14 year-old script kiddie would say after reading Neuromancer & Nietzsche is hilarious, but it doesn’t reduce the point, it is the way it is and the amount of systems getting compromised simply proves that. Personally, I can’t stand Nietzsche’s work, or the postmodernists & existentialists work thereafter.

I think you belittle the point of security networks and systems… look, flat out, it’s 2010, we’ve been TRYING to secure our networks for how long now? How many companies are still getting hacked? Just a year ago I did a SCADA pentest for a company and found multiple external paths to that network, so yeah, they don’t get it, it’s as simple as that.

I don’t necessarily agree that cyberwar is a useless way of talking about these problems. It’s only FUD if it’s definitely FUD, and I don’t think the concept of cyberwar is as far fetched as you’d like to make it (although I also hate the word cyber). Going forward, let’s consider it as the concept of “total war”, ie, meeting the enemy on any front that gains you advantage, as in, why would China attack us with planes when they’d clearly lose?

Raising awareness isn’t useless if it’s focused on achieving a resolution to a problem.

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By: Tom http://www.manifestdensity.net/2010/04/07/making-rumsfeld-look-like-a-techie-by-comparison/comment-page-1/#comment-13758 Tom Fri, 16 Apr 2010 15:28:08 +0000 http://www.manifestdensity.net/?p=1458#comment-13758 You know, even your own link acknowledges that the Brazilian SCADA hack wasn't a SCADA hack. But that's nitpicking. I agree that these systems will get more and more wired, and securing them should be a priority But frankly, this is not that tall of an order: we're talking about network segments that are not on the public internet. Secure the facilities, add some firewalls to make mitigating a DoS/DoC possible, and pipe your hilariously insecure legacy protocol over a tunnel or something. The Idaho lab does just this sort of work, and, surprise surprise, IOActive makes a living selling these services. So look, I'm not arguing that networks don't need to be secured. What I am saying is that "cyberwar" is a useless way of talking about these problems. Imagine if a reporter wrote a story about our national military readiness, but didn't mention any of the service branches, any weapon systems, any potential adversaries, or the relative feasibility of any of the threat scenarios under discussion (but oh, are they discussed -- they're terrifying!). Instead, he only talks about "offense" and "defense", and how some people warn that we don't have enough of them. And I have to say, your "sheep and wolves" line sounds like the type of thing a 14 year-old script kiddie would say after reading Neuromancer & Nietzsche. This vision of a sinister undernetwork where awesome cyberwizards do awesome cyberbattle -- so awesome that shit starts blowing up in the real world (awesomely)! -- is a juvenile romanticization of danger that's simultaneously silly, dangerous and seemingly pervasive enough to drive much of the thinking about electronic threats to our society. It's idiotic. Enough cyber. Let's talk about specific systems. You want to secure SCADA systems? Fine, let's talk about securing SCADA. Flailing our arms and screaming and having a grand cyber-freakout -- as that NPR piece, and virtually all "cyberwarfare" discussions seem intent on doing -- is useless. You know, even your own link acknowledges that the Brazilian SCADA hack wasn’t a SCADA hack. But that’s nitpicking. I agree that these systems will get more and more wired, and securing them should be a priority But frankly, this is not that tall of an order: we’re talking about network segments that are not on the public internet. Secure the facilities, add some firewalls to make mitigating a DoS/DoC possible, and pipe your hilariously insecure legacy protocol over a tunnel or something. The Idaho lab does just this sort of work, and, surprise surprise, IOActive makes a living selling these services.

So look, I’m not arguing that networks don’t need to be secured. What I am saying is that “cyberwar” is a useless way of talking about these problems. Imagine if a reporter wrote a story about our national military readiness, but didn’t mention any of the service branches, any weapon systems, any potential adversaries, or the relative feasibility of any of the threat scenarios under discussion (but oh, are they discussed — they’re terrifying!). Instead, he only talks about “offense” and “defense”, and how some people warn that we don’t have enough of them.

And I have to say, your “sheep and wolves” line sounds like the type of thing a 14 year-old script kiddie would say after reading Neuromancer & Nietzsche. This vision of a sinister undernetwork where awesome cyberwizards do awesome cyberbattle — so awesome that shit starts blowing up in the real world (awesomely)! — is a juvenile romanticization of danger that’s simultaneously silly, dangerous and seemingly pervasive enough to drive much of the thinking about electronic threats to our society.

It’s idiotic. Enough cyber. Let’s talk about specific systems. You want to secure SCADA systems? Fine, let’s talk about securing SCADA. Flailing our arms and screaming and having a grand cyber-freakout — as that NPR piece, and virtually all “cyberwarfare” discussions seem intent on doing — is useless.

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By: larry seltzer http://www.manifestdensity.net/2010/04/07/making-rumsfeld-look-like-a-techie-by-comparison/comment-page-1/#comment-13740 larry seltzer Fri, 16 Apr 2010 11:11:59 +0000 http://www.manifestdensity.net/?p=1458#comment-13740 Annoyed has a point, but even the SCADA stuff is full of conjecture and a mindset that says you have to worry about it because you can't prove it can't be done. And he's right that Clarke is a total douche, but Clarke was on the NSA. He's the one who told George Bush a few months before 9/11 that Bin Laden was determined to attack the US, but gave no information you could do anything with. He got a lot of airtime during the 9/11 commission hearings and wrote a book or two on it. Annoyed has a point, but even the SCADA stuff is full of conjecture and a mindset that says you have to worry about it because you can’t prove it can’t be done.

And he’s right that Clarke is a total douche, but Clarke was on the NSA. He’s the one who told George Bush a few months before 9/11 that Bin Laden was determined to attack the US, but gave no information you could do anything with. He got a lot of airtime during the 9/11 commission hearings and wrote a book or two on it.

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By: Annoyed http://www.manifestdensity.net/2010/04/07/making-rumsfeld-look-like-a-techie-by-comparison/comment-page-1/#comment-13726 Annoyed Fri, 16 Apr 2010 05:26:13 +0000 http://www.manifestdensity.net/?p=1458#comment-13726 Mayhaps if you did your research you would know what types of attacks are possible? Why bother dismissing it, and asking questions of the experts that you obviously haven't gone out to look for yourself, which doesn't make you look smart, just makes you look grumpy? Anyways, do some research on SCADA attacks, specifically look into Idaho National Labs work, as well as the work of IOActive (see their black hat talk). Some time ago, Brazil had their SCADA networks taken down by hackers (http://hardware.slashdot.org/story/09/11/11/1426256/How-Vulnerable-Is-emOurem-Power-Grid?from=rss) begging the question about ours, but in reality, there was a thirteen hour brownout on the eastern seaboard some years ago, supposedly caused by SCADA hackers (although I have no link at this time). Look, I get it, I hate the FUD, too. Obviously NPR is not the source to go to for security research and news and this Clarke guy who thinks the NSA has good offensive skills sounds like an absolute douche (they probably run Nessus and call it a day), but end of the day, doesn't mean you can blow off the risk. Or do, I don't care, the Internet is sheep and wolves... you're one, or you're the other, no gray area. Mayhaps if you did your research you would know what types of attacks are possible? Why bother dismissing it, and asking questions of the experts that you obviously haven’t gone out to look for yourself, which doesn’t make you look smart, just makes you look grumpy?

Anyways, do some research on SCADA attacks, specifically look into Idaho National Labs work, as well as the work of IOActive (see their black hat talk). Some time ago, Brazil had their SCADA networks taken down by hackers (http://hardware.slashdot.org/story/09/11/11/1426256/How-Vulnerable-Is-emOurem-Power-Grid?from=rss) begging the question about ours, but in reality, there was a thirteen hour brownout on the eastern seaboard some years ago, supposedly caused by SCADA hackers (although I have no link at this time).

Look, I get it, I hate the FUD, too. Obviously NPR is not the source to go to for security research and news and this Clarke guy who thinks the NSA has good offensive skills sounds like an absolute douche (they probably run Nessus and call it a day), but end of the day, doesn’t mean you can blow off the risk.

Or do, I don’t care, the Internet is sheep and wolves… you’re one, or you’re the other, no gray area.

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By: Eliza Hile http://www.manifestdensity.net/2010/04/07/making-rumsfeld-look-like-a-techie-by-comparison/comment-page-1/#comment-13343 Eliza Hile Sat, 10 Apr 2010 06:43:44 +0000 http://www.manifestdensity.net/?p=1458#comment-13343 This post is going into my bookmarks. This post is going into my bookmarks. ]]> By: Dear Journalists: There Is No Cyberwar | It's... just a dot http://www.manifestdensity.net/2010/04/07/making-rumsfeld-look-like-a-techie-by-comparison/comment-page-1/#comment-13328 Dear Journalists: There Is No Cyberwar | It's... just a dot Sat, 10 Apr 2010 01:46:07 +0000 http://www.manifestdensity.net/?p=1458#comment-13328 [...] on around the country, anywhere there are kids and spray paint. Thankfully, Tom Lee has written a scathing critique of dumb journalistic coverage of this whole "cyberwar" crap: The piece starts out by discussing Russian vandals' successful [...] [...] on around the country, anywhere there are kids and spray paint. Thankfully, Tom Lee has written a scathing critique of dumb journalistic coverage of this whole "cyberwar" crap: The piece starts out by discussing Russian vandals' successful [...] ]]> By: Dear Journalists: There Is No Cyberwar http://www.manifestdensity.net/2010/04/07/making-rumsfeld-look-like-a-techie-by-comparison/comment-page-1/#comment-13323 Dear Journalists: There Is No Cyberwar Sat, 10 Apr 2010 01:36:31 +0000 http://www.manifestdensity.net/?p=1458#comment-13323 [...] on around the country, anywhere there are kids and spray paint. Thankfully, Tom Lee has written a scathing critique of dumb journalistic coverage of this whole “cyberwar” crap: The piece starts out by discussing Russian [...] [...] on around the country, anywhere there are kids and spray paint. Thankfully, Tom Lee has written a scathing critique of dumb journalistic coverage of this whole “cyberwar” crap: The piece starts out by discussing Russian [...] ]]> By: Emily http://www.manifestdensity.net/2010/04/07/making-rumsfeld-look-like-a-techie-by-comparison/comment-page-1/#comment-13162 Emily Wed, 07 Apr 2010 19:36:50 +0000 http://www.manifestdensity.net/?p=1458#comment-13162 I think the better analogy is "the first twenty minutes of <em>Live Free or Die Hard</em>." I think the better analogy is “the first twenty minutes of Live Free or Die Hard.” ]]>